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ALL GOOD THINGS MIGHT COME TO AN
END: POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
IN CONNECTICUT
BERNARDO G. CUADRA*
INTRODUCTION
Postnuptial agreements1 made headlines in late 2010 when a
Los Angeles County judge ruled that the postnuptial agreement be
tween Frank McCourt and his wife, Jamie McCourt, was invalid and
thus did not control their property division at divorce.2 Frank and
Jamie, who had initiated divorce proceedings in California in 2009,
vehemently disputed ownership over the Los Angeles Dodgers, the
franchise Frank had purchased for $421 million in 2004.3 At the
center of that dispute was a postnuptial agreement, multiple copies
of which the couple had signed in Massachusetts and California in
2004.4 Incredibly, the copies signed in California were substantively
* J.D., Western New England University School of Law. Bernardo is an Associ
ate at Shipman & Goodwin LLP and currently practices in the area of Trusts and Es
tates. Prior to joining Shipman & Goodwin, Bernardo clerked for the Honorable
Flemming L. Norcott, Jr. of the Connecticut Supreme Court.
1. A postnuptial agreement is “[a]n agreement entered into during marriage to
define each spouse’s property rights in the event of death or divorce. The term com
monly refers to an agreement between spouses during the marriage at a time when
separation or divorce is not imminent.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1286 (9th ed. 2009).
Postnuptial agreements are sometimes referred to as “marital agreements;” see PRINCI
PLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.01
(1)(b) (2002); and “mid-marriage agreements;” see Pacelli v. Pacelli, 725 A.2d 56, 57-58
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
A particular subset of postnuptial agreements are “reconciliation agreements,”
which are “contract[s] between spouses who have had marital difficulties but who now
wish to save the marital relationship, [usually] by specifying certain economic actions
that might ameliorate pressures on the marriage.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1387
(9th ed. 2009); see, e.g., Hanner v. Hanner, 388 P.2d 239, 241 (Ariz. 1964) (“The law
encourages the resumption of marital relations. Since the purpose of a reconciliation
agreement is to restore marital relations, it harmonizes with public policy and will be
upheld.”).
2. McCourt v. McCourt, No. BD514309, 2010 WL 5092780, slip op. at 4-5 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2010); Greg Risling, Associated Press, McCourt Marital Pact on
Dodgers Ruled Invalid (Dec. 7, 2010), available at http://www.boston.com/sports/
other_sports/articles/ 2010/12/07/spokesman_mccourt_deal_on_dodgers_invalid/.
3. McCourt, 2010 WL 5092780, slip op. at 15.
4. Id. at 1, 7, 12.
57
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different from those signed in Massachusetts; the Massachusetts
copies contained an attachment that included the Los Angeles
Dodgers and other significant assets as Frank’s separate property,
while the California copies expressly excluded those assets from
Frank’s separate property.5
The judge’s ruling, in addition to accelerating the Los Angeles
Dodgers’ financial turmoil,6 directed attention to the existence of
postnuptial agreements and the procedures attendant to their draft
ing and execution. Although the judge decided the case based in
part on the absence of mutual assent,7 the McCourts’ postnuptial
agreement was doomed at the outset. First, both husband and wife
were represented by the same lawyer.8 Second, the parties had
signed two substantively different versions of the agreement.9 Fi
nally, the McCourts expressly acknowledged that they had not care
fully read the agreements, if at all.10
The McCourts’ marital dispute is, of course, unusual because it
involved the ownership of a Major League Baseball team. But dis
putes over the validity or enforceability of a postnuptial agreement
are not unique. Although a relatively recent creature,11 postnuptial
agreements have received increased media attention as of late,12
and many states have conclusively declared them to be valid, albeit
with varying restrictions.13
Recently, in Bedrick v. Bedrick, the Connecticut Supreme
Court addressed for the first time the validity and enforceability of
5. Id. at 7-8.
6. See Bill Shaikin, In Filing for Bankruptcy, Dodgers Will Ask Judge to Override
MLB Rules, L.A. TIMES (June 27, 2011), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/
jun/27/sports/ la-sp-dodgers-bankruptcy-20110628.
7. McCourt, 2010 WL 5092780, slip op. at 67.
8. Id. at 10.
9. Id. at 13-14.
10. Id. at 12, 62.
11. Sean Hannon Williams, Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 827, 829;
Linda Ravdin, Marital Agreements, Tax Management (BNA) No. 849, § I(G), at A-3
(2003) (“Postmarital agreements not incident to marital separation are of more recent
vintage.”).
12. See, e.g., Robert DiGiacomo, Quit Fighting—Get a Postnuptial Agreement,
CNN.COM (Apr. 2, 2008), http://articles.cnn.com/2008-04-02/living/postnuptial.agreement_1_prenuptial-postnuptial-agreements-inheritance-money?_s=PM:LIVING; Susan
Pease Gadoua, The Legal Alternative Every Couple Should Know About Before Going
to Divorce Court, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
susan-pease-gadoua/the-legal-alternative-eve_b_948865.html.
13. Williams, supra note 11, at 881.
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postnuptial agreements.14 The court concluded that postnuptial
agreements are consistent with public policy and thus enforceable if
a particular agreement “complies with applicable contract princi
ples, and the terms of the agreement are both fair and equitable at
the time of execution and not unconscionable at the time of dissolu
tion.”15 Although the opinion sets forth substantial guidance for
practitioners seeking to draft valid postnuptial agreements, at least
three important questions remain: (1) does the promise to forgo
divorce and remain married serve as adequate consideration for the
agreement; (2) what does the unconscionability test actually re
quire; and (3) who carries the burden of proof, the proponent of or
the challenger to the agreement?
This Article identifies and analyzes this open space left by
Bedrick. Part I briefly reviews the state of the law governing pre
nuptial agreements in Connecticut and the factual background to
Bedrick. Part II examines the Bedrick standard for reviewing post
nuptial agreements and highlights the areas where the Bedrick
court may have fallen short. Part III reviews relevant law from
Connecticut and other jurisdictions and proposes potential solu
tions to the questions left unresolved by Bedrick.
I. THE BEDRICK BACKDROP
Bedrick v. Bedrick came to the Connecticut Supreme Court on
the husband’s appeal from the trial court’s judgment declaring the
postnuptial agreement invalid.16 On appeal, the husband, relying
on Connecticut case law addressing prenuptial agreements, argued,
inter alia, that the trial court improperly declined to apply princi
ples of contract law in evaluating the enforceability of the parties’
postnuptial agreement.17 This Part accordingly reviews the relevant
law on prenuptial agreements and then sets forth the factual basis
for the husband’s appeal.
A. Standards for Prenuptial Agreements in Connecticut
Connecticut has two different standards for determining the
enforceability of prenuptial agreements. The date of the execution
14. Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 21 (Conn. 2011). In 2010, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court also addressed postnuptial agreements for the first time and
upheld their validity. Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E.2d 955, 961 (Mass. 2010).
15. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 24, 27.
16. Id. at 22.
17. Id. at 23.
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of the agreement determines which standard applies. Agreements
signed before October 1, 1995, must comply with the standard set
forth in McHugh v. McHugh.18 In McHugh, the Connecticut Su
preme Court stated that a prenuptial agreement is enforceable if
(1) the contract was validly entered into; (2) its terms do not vio
late statute or public policy; and (3) the circumstances of the par
ties at the time the marriage is dissolved are not so beyond the
contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered
into as to cause its enforcement to work injustice.19

McHugh specified that a prenuptial agreement’s validity at execu
tion is governed by ordinary principles of contract law, and thus,
each party must knowingly and voluntarily enter into the agree
ment and, absent independent knowledge by the other party, fully
disclose all assets.20 Some ambiguity existed, however, regarding
who carried the burden of proof21 and what standard of review ap
plied to the contract terms at the time of execution, if any.22
The Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act (Premarital
Agreement Act), enacted in 1995, cleared up this ambiguity. For
prenuptial agreements executed on or after October 1, 1995, the
Premarital Agreement Act governs enforceability.23 That statute
principally provides that a prenuptial agreement is enforceable only
if it was entered into voluntarily, it was not unconscionable at the
time of execution or enforcement, and both parties provided full
18. Id. at 25.
19. McHugh v. McHugh, 436 A.2d 8, 11 (Conn. 1980).
20. Id. at 11. The court also noted other factors to be considered, including
“which party drafted the agreement . . . and whether the parties were represented by
counsel.” Id. at 12. Although the court did not directly address consideration, quoting
Sacksell v. Barrett, the court stated that “there appears to be no good reason why such
an agreement, if fairly made and entered into, by a [person] of full age, for adequate
consideration received, should not be binding upon [him].” Id. (quoting Sacksell v.
Barrett, 43 A.2d 79, 81 (1945)) (alteration in original).
21. The confusion over the burden of proof permeated the lower courts. Com
pare Lord v. Lord, No. 10 11 97, 1995 WL 17356, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 1995)
(noting “the proponent of the enforceability of the antenuptial agreement . . . bears the
burden of proof on the issue”), with Baumgartner v. Baumgartner, No. FA 960155390S,
1998 WL 811565, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 1998) (noting that the challenger did
not meet her burden of proof for establishing inadequate disclosure, duress, or undue
influence). The Connecticut Appellate and Supreme Courts later confirmed that the
challenger carries this burden in Winchester v. McCue, 882 A.2d 143, 149 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2005) and Crews v. Crews, 989 A.2d 1060, 1069 (Conn. 2010), respectively. See also
Louis Parley, Premarital Agreements in Connecticut Where We Are and Where We Are
Going, 69 CONN. B.J. 495, 505 (1995).
22. See Parley, supra note 21, at 507.
23. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-36a to -36j (2011).
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financial disclosure and had a reasonable opportunity to consult
with independent counsel prior to signing.24 Significantly, the
spouse who challenges enforcement of the agreement bears the
burden of establishing that the agreement is invalid.25 In addition,
consideration is not a requirement for enforcement.26
In contrast to Connecticut’s established body of law on pre
nuptial agreements, there had not been any law governing the en
forceability of postnuptial agreements before the Connecticut
Supreme Court decided Bedrick. Connecticut Superior Courts at
tempted to fill this void by turning to analogous statutory law, con
tract law, and principles of fairness.27 In 2011, however, Bedrick
presented this question of first impression for the Connecticut Su
preme Court to resolve.
B. Background on Bedrick
Bruce and Deborah Bedrick married in 197628 and subse
quently executed a postnuptial agreement on December 10, 1977.29
During the early years of their marriage, the Bedricks updated their
postnuptial agreement five times, executing the latest addendum in
May of 1989.30 In relevant part, the postnuptial agreement and its
addendums provided that, upon dissolution of the marriage: (1)
both parties waived any claim to alimony or to any part of the other
spouse’s estate; (2) Bruce released Deborah from liability for out
standing business loans on his car wash business; and (3) Bruce
would pay Deborah a cash settlement of $75,000.31
The personal and financial circumstances of the Bedricks were
not extraordinary. The Bedricks married at age twenty-five, neither
with a college degree.32 At the time that they married, the Bedricks
24. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36g. Notably, the requirement of an opportunity to
consult with independent counsel departs from McHugh’s inclusion of that opportunity
as a factor to consider. McHugh, 436 A.2d at 11; see Parley, supra note 21, at 505, 509.
Contra Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 28 n.6 (Conn. 2011) (stating that “opportunity to
confer with independent [legal] counsel” should be considered when courts evaluate
whether agreement was fair and reasonable at execution).
25. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36g(a).
26. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36c.
27. Bedrick v. Bedrick, No. FA074007533, 2009 WL 1335100, at *2 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Apr. 24, 2009).
28. Bedrick, 2009 WL 1335100, at *3.
29. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 22. The Bedricks’ postnuptial agreement is reproduced in
the appendix to this article. See infra Appendix.
30. Id.
31. Id.; Bedrick, 2009 WL 1335100, at *3.
32. Bedrick, 2009 WL 1335100, at *3.
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worked at Mr. Auto Wash, the Bedrick family car wash business.33
In 1986, after ten years of marriage, Bruce purchased the family
business from his parents for $320,000 and, in 1994, he purchased
the real estate upon which it was located for $280,000.34 The
Bedricks both worked in the family car wash business throughout
their marriage.35 Their only son was born in 1991.36
In 2007, after thirty-two years of marriage, Deborah filed for
dissolution, and Bruce subsequently filed a cross-complaint to en
force their postnuptial agreement.37 At that time, the parties’ com
bined marital assets totaled $927,123.0038 After trial, the trial court
concluded that the postnuptial agreement was neither fair and equi
table nor supported by adequate consideration, and further, that
the parties’ financial circumstances “had changed dramatically since
. . . 1989.”39 Accordingly, the trial court declined to enforce the
postnuptial agreement.40
II.

THE BEDRICK STANDARD

In Bedrick v. Bedrick, the Connecticut Supreme Court out
lined the standard to be applied when determining whether a post
nuptial agreement is enforceable.41 In doing so, the court explicitly
stated that a stricter standard of review was required than that ap
plied to prenuptial agreements, based on the nature of the relation
ship between spouses.42 The court concluded that, although
postnuptial agreements were consistent with public policy and thus
valid in Connecticut, the parties’ agreement ultimately was not en
forceable because its terms were unconscionable at the time of
dissolution.43
In reaching its decision, the court articulated the following
standard for enforceability of postnuptial agreements: “In applying
special scrutiny, a court may enforce a postnuptial agreement only
if it complies with applicable contract principles, and the terms of
the agreement are both fair and equitable at the time of execution
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 21-22 (Conn. 2011).
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 24, 29.
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and not unconscionable at the time of dissolution.”44 Although the
court specifically stated that this standard called for greater scru
tiny, it did not explain what exactly it meant by “stricter scrutiny.”45
This Part reviews the Bedrick test and identifies its potential
shortcomings.
A. Contract Principles
The court first briefly noted that contract principles would ap
ply to postnuptial agreements.46 In a footnote, however, the court
made clear that, in contrast to prenuptial agreements, postnuptial
agreements do require adequate consideration to be enforceable.47
Further, the court stated that “[a] release by one spouse of his or
her interest in the estate of the other spouse, in exchange for a simi
lar release by the other spouse, may constitute adequate considera
tion.”48 Significantly, the court determined that, in the case of the
Bedricks, adequate consideration was furnished in the form of mu
tual releases and waivers: the wife had waived her right to alimony
and any interest in the husband’s assets, including the car wash bus
iness, and, in return, the husband had waived his right to alimony
and any interest in the wife’s assets and also had released the wife
from any liability relative to the husband’s business.49
Notwithstanding the court’s clear pronouncement that consid
eration is a requirement for postnuptial agreements, Bedrick left
for another day the issue of whether a spouse’s promise to remain
married—i.e., the promise not to divorce—may be sufficient con
sideration for a postnuptial agreement.50 “Consideration consists
of a benefit to the party promising, or a loss or detriment to the
party to whom the promise is made,”51 and may take the form of
“forbearance from action that [a] party would otherwise have been
44. Id. at 27.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 27 n.5. Interestingly, a premarital agreement later amended after mar
riage does not require consideration. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36f (2011).
48. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 27 n.5.
49. Id.
50. Id. The court understandably avoided the issue because the defendant did
not press it. Id.; see also Sequenzia v. Guerrieri Masonry Inc., 9 A.3d 322, 324 (Conn.
2010) (noting that appellate courts should not decide issues not properly before it). In
any event, the court did not address “whether a spouse’s forbearance from bringing a
claimed dissolution action and the continuation of the marriage provides adequate con
sideration for a postnuptial agreement.” Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 27 n.5.
51. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 27 n.5.
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entitled to take.”52 Thus, a party who forbears from filing for di
vorce has given up a right to which he was entitled. Courts, how
ever, have come out both ways on the issue of whether such
forbearance serves as adequate consideration to support a postnup
tial agreement.53 Although Bedrick does not state where Connecti
cut may fall, the court’s increased scrutiny of postnuptial
agreements suggests that something more than the promise not to
divorce will be required to support the agreement.
B. Fair and Equitable at Execution
The court spent considerably more time discussing the require
ment that a postnuptial agreement’s terms be fair and equitable at
the time of execution. The court initially focused on the procedural
requirements at the time of execution:
We further hold that the terms of a postnuptial agreement are
fair and equitable at the time of execution if the agreement is
made voluntarily, and without any undue influence, fraud, coer
cion, duress or similar defect. Moreover, each spouse must be
given full, fair and reasonable disclosure of the amount, character
and value of property, both jointly and separately held, and all of
the financial obligations and income of the other spouse.54

The court then set forth a totality of the circumstances analysis that
takes into consideration several “factors, including the nature and
complexity of the agreement’s terms, the extent of and disparity in
assets brought to the marriage by each spouse, . . . traits potentially
affecting the ability [of the parties] to read and understand an
agreement’s provisions, and the” time available to each party to re
view the agreement’s terms and consult with independent counsel.55
These considerations are identical to those embodied in the Pre
marital Agreement Act, which provides in part that a premarital
agreement is enforceable if it was executed voluntarily and if the
opponent to the agreement was “provided a fair and reasonable dis
closure of the amount, character and value of property, financial
obligations and income of the other party.”56
52. Ravdin, supra note 11, at A-41 n.515.
53. Compare In re Marriage of Tabassum & Younis, 881 N.E.2d 396, 407 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2007) (forbearance from bringing divorce is adequate consideration), with
Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 603 (Tenn. 2006) (holding that a “promise not to
leave [your spouse] is clearly not consideration for the agreement”).
54. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 27.
55. Id. at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36g(a)(1) & (3) (2011).
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Although the second Bedrick prong bears substantial similari
ties with the Premarital Agreement Act, several differences warrant
attention. First, consistent with the court’s statement that postnup
tial agreements require heightened scrutiny, the court imposed a
more rigorous “fair and reasonable” standard on the postnuptial
agreement’s terms at the time of execution.57 This fair and reasona
ble standard sets a higher threshold for enforceability than the un
conscionability standard because it is easier for the challenger to
establish that an agreement was not fair and reasonable at the time
of execution than it is to prove that it was unconscionable at that
time.58 Indeed, the court recognized this distinction by noting that
“[u]nfairness or inequality alone does not render a postnuptial
agreement unconscionable.”59 Thus, the court’s imposition of this
standard ultimately decreases the overall likelihood that a postnup
tial agreement will be enforced.60
Second, the court did not indicate whether the opponent car
ries the burden of establishing that the terms of the agreement were
fair and reasonable at the time of execution, as is statutorily re
quired for premarital agreements in Connecticut,61 or whether the
proponent would carry that burden. Although the court’s imposi
tion of heightened scrutiny for postnuptial agreements suggests that
the proponent carries the burden, both parties to the agreement
should anticipate the possibility of future litigation.

57. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 27.
58. See Upham v. Upham, 630 N.E.2d 307, 311 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (“Although
there may be substantial overlap between the [conscionability and fair and reasonable]
standards, a standard of conscionability generally ‘requires a greater showing of inap
propriateness.’” (quoting 3 ALEXANDER LINDEY & LOUIS I. PARLEY, SEPARATION
AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 90.07 (2d ed. 2011))); Lounsbury v.
Lounsbury, 752 N.Y.S.2d 103, 107 (App. Div. 2002) (“[A] separation agreement is not
per se unconscionable simply because marital assets are divided unequally . . . , because
one spouse gave away more than [that spouse] might have been legally required to do
. . . , or because the spouse’s decision to approve the agreement might be characterized
as unwise.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in origi
nal)); 2 ALEXANDER LINDEY & LOUIS I. PARLEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND AN
TENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 120.55[2] (2d ed. 2011) (“[Unconscionability] is a higher
standard for the assailant to overcome . . . .” (emphasis added)).
59. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 28.
60. See David M. Cotter, Substantive Sufficiency of Marital Agreements: Uncon
scionability and Unfairness, 17 DIVORCE LITIG. 173, 180 (Nov. 2005) (“[I]t is generally
more difficult to set aside a marital agreement on the ground of unconscionability.”).
61. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36g(a) (placing burden on “the party against whom
enforcement is sought”).
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Finally, the court did not require that each party have a reason
able opportunity to consult with counsel.62 Instead, the court
merely stated that courts, “in evaluating the circumstances sur
rounding a particular agreement, . . . should examine . . . whether
[the parties] had a reasonable opportunity to confer with indepen
dent counsel.”63 By delegating this question to the totality-of-the
circumstances analysis, the court effectively lowered the threshold
for establishing the validity of the postnuptial agreement; recall that
the opportunity to consult with counsel is a statutory requirement
for applicable prenuptial agreements.64 Here, the court departed
from its mandate to increase judicial scrutiny applied to postnuptial
agreements. Indeed, at least one jurisdiction—Minnesota—simi
larly seeking to increase scrutiny on postnuptial agreements has leg
islatively taken the opposite approach of the Bedrick court by
mandating that each party to a prenuptial agreement have the op
portunity to meet with legal counsel while requiring that parties to
a postnuptial agreement each have separate counsel at the time of
execution.65 Notwithstanding the ambiguity present in Bedrick,
lawyers should remain vigilant and ensure that the opposing party is
represented by counsel.66
C. Not Unconscionable at Enforcement
Finally, the court reviewed the unconscionability prong, upon
which it decided the case. The court first indicated that a postnup
tial agreement that produces an unfair or unequal result does not
reach the threshold of unconscionability: “Instead, the question of
whether enforcement of an agreement would be unconscionable is
analogous to determining whether enforcement of an agreement
would work an injustice.”67 Here, the court drew an important con
nection to Connecticut jurisprudence on the enforceability of pre
62. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 28 n.6.
63. Id.
64. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36g(a)(4); see Friezo v. Friezo, 914 A.2d 533, 557
(Conn. 2007).
65. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 519.11 (1), (1a) (West Supp. 2011).
66. Jurisdictions come out differently on the requirement of representation or the
reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel. Compare Stoner v. Stoner, 819 A.2d 529,
532, 533 n.5 (Pa. 2003) (“[D]eclin[ing] to impose a per se requirement that parties had
to obtain independent legal counsel . . . .”), and Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E.2d 955,
963 (Mass. 2010) (judge should consider if the parties “had an opportunity to obtain
separate legal counsel of [their] own choosing . . .”), with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 519.11
(1a)(c) (independent counsel required for each party).
67. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 28.
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nuptial agreements, a body of law that should be helpful in
evaluating postnuptial agreements. The court also noted that the
occurrence of unforeseen events, “such as having a child, loss of
employment or moving to another state . . .” could render the en
forcement of a postnuptial agreement unconscionable.68 The court
ultimately concluded that the Bedricks’ postnuptial agreement was
invalid because it was unconscionable. Specifically, the court fo
cused on the changed financial picture of the husband’s car wash
business and upheld the trial court’s determination “that enforce
ment of the postnuptial agreement would have worked [an]
injustice.”69
Although the court’s conclusion is a useful starting point, its
guidance is incomplete.70 First, the court did not explain the uncon
scionability standard in the context of postnuptial agreements; it
merely asked whether enforcement of the postnuptial agreement
would work an injustice.71 The court then passed on the opportu
nity to establish a workable test by applying that standard to the
facts in Bedrick. Although the court reviewed the basic provisions
of the postnuptial agreement, as well as the Bedricks’ employment
history and then-current financial circumstances, it did not examine
the intent of the parties at the time that they signed the agreement
or whether the circumstances at dissolution were consistent with
the parties’ expectations.72 In other words, the court did not deter
mine whether the parties had contemplated their eventual financial
or familial positions. Instead, the court disregarded any guidance it
could have taken from Crews and sidestepped the examination of
foreseeability. The result was the court’s conclusion that “[t]he
facts and circumstances of the present case clearly support the find
ings of the trial court that, as a matter of law, enforcement of the
agreement would be unconscionable.”73 At the very least, such a
dismissive conclusion is unfair to the litigants and potentially incon
sistent with the court’s own guidance in Crews.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Again, the court did not identify which party bears the burden of establishing
the unconscionability of the agreement.
71. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 28.
72. Id. at 29. This “mixed question[ ] of fact and law, which require[d] the appli
cation of a legal standard to the historical-fact determinations, . . . [called for] plenary
review by [the] court unfettered by the clearly erroneous standard . . . .” Crews v.
Crews, 989 A.2d 1060, 1066 (Conn. 2010) (quoting Friezo v. Friezo, 914 A.2d 533, 544
(Conn. 2007)).
73. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 29.
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Moreover, the court’s suggestion that the birth of a child dur
ing marriage may be an unforeseeable circumstance is indepen
dently puzzling.74 Certainly, if a married couple had taken steps to
prevent a pregnancy, or were so far beyond the age when preg
nancy is considered a potential outcome warranting consideration,
the subsequent birth of a child could be considered unforeseeable.
But, in an otherwise healthy marriage, the birth of a child is the
result of consensual sexual intercourse or the use of artificial repro
ductive technology—conscious decisions made by adults who know
the potential outcomes of those actions. Thus, unless the opponent
to a postnuptial agreement can demonstrate that the couple was
actively seeking to prevent pregnancy or otherwise was under the
medical impression that the potential for pregnancy was highly un
likely,75 the birth of a child should not be considered an unforesee
able circumstance when evaluating the enforceability of a
postnuptial agreement.76
74. Id. at 28 (“Unforeseen changes in the relationship, such as having a child, loss
of employment or moving to another state, may render enforcement of the agreement
unconscionable.”).
75. Here, the plaintiff presented no evidence suggesting that the birth of their son
was not contemplated, and indeed, that point was not advanced by the wife on appeal.
See generally Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellee, Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17 (No. SC 18568). The
plaintiff did, however, make that argument to the trial court. See Bedrick v. Bedrick,
No. FA074007533, 2009 WL 1335100, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2009) (“[T]he
plaintiff argues that the agreement is unenforceable because the financial circumstances
of the parties and their assets have changed significantly since the last modification, in
particular the parties had a child . . . .”). However, while the court was in agreement
with the trial court’s conclusion that “[t]he economic circumstances of the parties had
changed dramatically since the execution of the agreement,” the court also took care to
mention that the last addendum to the postnuptial agreement was executed before “the
birth of the parties’ son in 1991.” Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 29 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In addition to the court’s unusual conclusion that the birth of a child is an
unforeseeable circumstance to consider in the unconscionability calculus, the court also
may have neglected to apply its own standard: the language of the parties’ postnuptial
agreement, by virtue of its reference to “child support,” demonstrates that they actually
contemplated the possibility of having children. Brief of the Defendant-Appellant at
A5, Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17 (No. SC 18568). Thus, to the extent that the court considered
the birth of the child an unforeseen circumstance, the court may have been in error.
76. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court took this position during its review of a
contested prenuptial agreement:
[E]veryone who enters a long-term agreement knows that circumstances can
change during its term, so that what initially appeared desirable might prove
to be an unfavorable bargain. Such are the risks that contracting parties rou
tinely assume. Certainly, the possibilities of illness, birth of children, reliance
upon a spouse, career change, financial gain or loss, and numerous other events
that can occur in the course of a marriage cannot be regarded as unforeseeable.
If parties choose not to address such matters in their prenuptial agreements,
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This is not to say that a child’s well-being should be disre
garded when evaluating an agreement’s unconscionability at en
forcement. The American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution includes the birth or adoption of a child
as a factor to consider when evaluating whether enforcement of a
postnuptial agreement would work a substantial injustice.77 Specifi
cally, the ALI notes that a couple’s inherent optimism toward mar
riage may handicap each partner’s ability to accurately anticipate
marriage outcomes.78 The ALI also notes that because the postseparation family unit may include children living with one primary
caregiver an agreement’s financial provisions may have a detrimen
tal effect on those children.79
The ALI’s concerns over children are couched, however, in
terms of identifying agreements subject to scrutiny in the first in
stance. Thus, a court does not conduct the substantial-injustice in
quiry unless the challenger to the agreement shows that, since
execution, a fixed number of years have passed, a child was born or
adopted, or that there has been an unforeseeable change of circum
stances.80 Further, when such a circumstance exists, the challenger
to the agreement bears the burden of proving that enforcement of
they must be regarded as having contracted to bear the risk of events that alter
the value of their bargains.
Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 166 (Pa. 1990) (emphasis added); cf. Larsen v.
Scholl, 296 N.W.2d 785, 790 (Iowa 1980) (“[A] direct, foreseeable cause and effect rela
tionship exists between defendant’s Iowa contacts involving sexual intercourse and the
resulting child born in Iowa to an Iowa mother.”); McKenna v. Bennett, 558 P.2d 1281,
1283 (Or. 1977) (“The birth of the child in Oregon for whom the parent would have a
legal obligation of support is a foreseeable consequence of an act of sexual intercourse
in Oregon.”). But see Townley v. Townley, No. FA89-0102083 S, 1991 WL 27269, at *1
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 1991) (noting that birth of a child was a “changed circum
stance[ ] . . . that [was] not contemplated in the [prenuptial] agreement”).
77. Section 7.05 provides, in relevant part, that
[a] court should consider whether enforcement of an agreement would work a
substantial injustice if, and only if, the party resisting its enforcement shows
that one or more of the following have occurred since the time of the agree
ment’s execution: . . . (b) a child was born to, or adopted by, the parties, who
at the time of execution had no children. . . .
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 7.05(2)(b) (2002).
78. “Even childless parties who anticipate having children are often unable to
anticipate the impact that children will have on their values and life plans. Once they
are parents, the effect of the terms they earlier agreed upon are [sic] therefore likely to
seem quite different than they expected when childless.” Id. § 7.05 comment b; see also
id. § 7.05 reporter’s notes on comment b (discussing couples’ over-optimism towards
marriage outcomes).
79. Id. § 7.05 comment c.
80. Id. § 7.05(2).
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the agreement will cause a substantial injustice.81 Accordingly, the
ALI’s consideration of whether a child was born after execution is a
more robust and balanced analysis than the Bedrick court’s exami
nation, which seems to suggest that the birth of a child may be per
se unforeseeable.82
III.

THE BEDRICK DILEMMAS

With its decision in Bedrick, the Connecticut Supreme Court
joined the majority of states that have concluded, legislatively or
judicially, that postnuptial agreements are valid and enforceable.83
In addition, the court also joined the majority of states that have
applied stricter scrutiny to postnuptial agreements as compared to
prenuptial agreements.84 What the court did not do, however, was
clearly explain how the heightened level of scrutiny would be ap
plied. Moreover, the court did not decide whether the promise to
remain married constitutes adequate consideration, how the uncon
scionability standard is applied, and which party carries the burden.
This Part searches for answers within and outside of Connecticut.
A. Continued Marriage as Consideration
Courts in some states have held that the continuation of the
marriage, in certain circumstances, is sufficient consideration. In
New York, for example, if a marriage is on the verge of collapse,
the continuation of the marriage itself can be sufficient considera
tion.85 In Zagari v. Zagari, the parties had clearly been experienc
ing marital discord; four years into the marriage, the wife left for
Germany and lived there for four months.86 She subsequently
moved back to New York but remained out of the marital home for
another two months.87 Under these facts, the New York Supreme
Court concluded that “the continuation of the marriage may have
been very valuable consideration on the part of the wife.”88
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. § 7.05(3).
Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 28 (Conn. 2011).
See Williams, supra note 11, at 881.
Id.
See, e.g., Zagari v. Zagari, 746 N.Y.S.2d 235, 238 (Sup. Ct. 2002); cf. 45 N.Y.
JURISPRUDENCE 2D, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 168 (2007) (“When required, courts have
generally held that the marriage itself may be sufficient consideration for an antenuptial
or prenuptial agreement.”).
86. Zagari, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 238 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In contrast, in Whitmore v. Whitmore, the Appellate Division
held that the continuation of the marriage was not sufficient consid
eration.89 There, the spouses had signed their postnuptial agree
ment three months after their marriage.90 The court rejected the
husband’s contention that the continuation of the marriage was ad
equate consideration and concluded that, in the absence of any
other promises or releases by the husband, the postnuptial agree
ment was unenforceable for lack of consideration.91 Although the
court did not explain why the continuation of the marriage was in
adequate, the court restricted its conclusion to “the circumstances
of this case,” which presumably referred to the absence of marital
discord.92
Some states have recognized the continuation of the marriage,
or the promise not to divorce, as adequate consideration without a
prerequisite of marital discord. For example, in In re Marriage of
Tabassum and Younis, the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that
“[f]orbearance of bringing or prosecuting a divorce action has been
directly recognized as consideration in other states, and we find no
compelling reason to deviate from these authorities.”93 Other
states accept the promise not to divorce, coupled with marital dis
cord, as adequate consideration in the context of reconciliation
agreements.94 Note that the requirement of some degree of marital
discord is consistent with the principle that “past consideration can
not support a current promise.”95 Moreover, the promise to recon
89. Whitmore v. Whitmore, 778 N.Y.S.2d 73, 75 (App. Div. 2004).
90. Id. at 74.
91. Id. at 75.
92. Id. The court also cited Zagari, which involved not only clear allegations of
marital discord but also the execution of a postnuptial contract over four years into the
marriage. Zagari, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 238. Contra Whitmore, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 74 (noting
three months between marriage and contract execution).
93. In re Marriage of Tabassum & Younis, 881 N.E.2d 396, 407 (Ill. App. Ct.
2007).
94. See Flansburg v. Flansburg, 581 N.E.2d 430, 434 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)
(“[E]xtension of a marriage that would have otherwise been dissolved but for the exe
cution of an agreement to reconcile has been deemed adequate consideration.”); Pacelli
v. Pacelli, 725 A.2d 56, 59 (N.J. App. Div. 1999) (“A prerequisite to enforcement [of a
reconciliation agreement] is a requirement that ‘the marital relationship has deterio
rated at least to the brink of an indefinite separation or a suit for divorce.’” (quoting
Nicholson v. Nicholson, 489 A.2d 1247, 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985))); Bratton
v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 603 (Tenn. 2004) (noting that “this was not a reconciliation
agreement where separation or divorce was imminent, making the wife’s promise to
remain in the marriage a meaningful act”).
95. Id. at 600; see also Simmons v. Simmons, 249 S.W.3d 843, 846-47 (Ark. Ct.
App. 2007).
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cile and continue the marriage must be genuine and made in good
faith, i.e., it must not be illusory.96 Finally, some states have
avoided the issue by simply eliminating consideration as a require
ment for enforcement of a postnuptial agreement.97
The Bedrick court made clear that consideration is a required
element of a valid postnuptial agreement. The only open question
remaining is what will constitute adequate consideration. Under
Bedrick’s heightened scrutiny, the likely answer is that promises to
remain in the marriage or not to divorce will cause an agreement to
fail for lack of consideration. Attorneys drafting postnuptial agree
ments should draft accordingly and consider mutual waiver provi
sions that release some right to or interest in the other spouse’s
property, such as a release of alimony or a claim to the other
spouse’s property at death.98
Notwithstanding the court’s clear position on this issue, there
remains the question of whether the requirement of consideration
actually protects against the “greater potential for one spouse to
take advantage of the other.”99 Consideration does not need to be
substantial,100 and parties can likely supply adequate consideration
through nominal transfers of separate property.101 Thus, “a crafty
lawyer can draft a valid postnuptial agreement without ever ad
dressing the court’s core concern: the potentially ‘unjust advantage’
that one spouse may have in the negotiation process.”102
B. Unconscionable at the Time of Enforcement
1. Connecticut
Bedrick provides an initial glimpse into what circumstances
might lead a court to conclude that enforcement of an agreement
96. See Fogg v. Fogg, 567 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Mass. 1991) (holding unenforceable a
postnuptial agreement where the agreement “was signed as a result of the wife’s im
plied fraudulent promise that she would attempt to preserve the marriage”); Marshall v.
Marshall, 273 S.E.2d 360, 363 (W. Va. 1980) (noting that the husband’s promise not to
divorce was inadequate consideration where he filed for divorce after receiving benefit
of the postnuptial agreement).
97. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-2-302(1), -303 (2005); WIS. STAT. § 766.58
(2001); Laudig v. Laudig, 624 A.2d 651, 654-55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); see also PRINCI
PLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.01
(4) (2002).
98. Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 27 n.5 (Conn. 2011); Bratton, 136 S.W.3d at
604 n.2.
99. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 27.
100. Ravdin, supra note 11, at § I(K)(4), A-41 (2003).
101. Williams, supra note 11, at 841.
102. Id.
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would be unconscionable. That said, the court’s analysis was brief
and, based on its conclusion that the question of “uncon
scionab[ility] is analogous to determining whether enforcement of
an agreement would work an injustice,”103 potentially creates some
tension with previous decisions that have considered whether the
enforcement of a prenuptial agreement would work an injustice.
Although the court did not apply the existing case law on prenup
tial agreements to the facts of Bedrick, those decisions provide in
struction on what factual findings might lead a court to conclude
that enforcement of an agreement would be unconscionable.
In Crews v. Crews, the Connecticut Supreme Court, in addition
to emphasizing the challenger’s “heavy burden”104 when challeng
ing the validity of a prenuptial agreement, also addressed for the
first time the analysis required under the third prong of McHugh:105
To render unenforceable an otherwise valid ante-nuptial agree
ment, a court must determine: (1) the parties’ intent and circum
stances when they signed the antenuptial agreement; (2) the
circumstances of the parties at the time of the dissolution of the
marriage; (3) whether those circumstances are “so far beyond”
the contemplation of the parties at the time of execution; and (4)
if the circumstances are beyond the parties’ initial contemplation,
whether enforcement would cause an injustice.106

On review, the court agreed with the defendant “that there [was]
insufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate that the change
in the circumstances between the parties at the time of dissolution
was not contemplated.”107 The facts were as follows. After a six
teen year marriage, the wife had filed for divorce. At the time of
trial, she had an annual net income of $69,056, and her husband,
$98,540.108 The husband owned the marital home along with invest
ment and retirement assets, while the wife owned a business valued
at $96,000.109 Through the prenuptial agreement, the wife had
103. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 28.
104. Crews v. Crews, 989 A.2d 1060, 1069 (Conn. 2010).
105. The wife had challenged the validity of the prenuptial agreement based on
the injustice that would result from its enforcement, an argument that implicated Mc
Hugh’s third prong. McHugh v. McHugh, 436 A.2d 8, 11 (Conn. 1980). The Crews
prenuptial agreement had been executed in 1988 and thus was subject to the McHugh
common law test. Crews, 989 A.2d at 1063.
106. Crews, 989 A.2d at 1069.
107. Id. at 1067.
108. Id. at 1062-63.
109. Id.
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waived her right to, inter alia, alimony and any share in the hus
band’s assets or marital home.110
The court faulted the wife, who had challenged the prenuptial
agreement, for her failure to establish that there was a dramatic,
unforeseeable change in circumstances between the time of execu
tion and the time of dissolution.111 Although the trial court had
concluded that during that interval, “the parties’ financial circum
stances had changed dramatically,”112 the court determined that the
financial circumstances at divorce were foreseeable and consistent
with what was contemplated at the time they executed the prenup
tial agreement.113 In fact, the court found that the prenuptial agree
ment itself provided evidence of the parties’ intentions and
expectations, and militated against a finding that enforcement
would work an injustice.114
Similarly, in Winchester v. McCue, the Connecticut Appellate
Court upheld the enforcement of a prenuptial agreement that the
wife had challenged as unconscionable under the third prong of Mc
Hugh.115 There, the husband’s financial assets had increased sub
stantially116 but, according to the court, not so much as to warrant a
finding that enforcement of the agreement would be unconsciona
ble.117 Similar to Crews, the court emphasized that the wife had
failed to demonstrate that the changed financial circumstances were
extraordinary and unforeseeable, stating “that the threshold for
finding such a dramatic change is high.”118
Given this precedent, it is unclear why the Bedrick court de
clined to evaluate the circumstances of the parties pursuant to the
unconscionability test set forth in Crews. Notwithstanding the obvi
ous distinction between Crews and Bedrick—namely, the review of
a prenuptial agreement in the former and a postnuptial in the lat
ter—the underlying question of whether enforcement of the agree
110. Id. at 1063.
111. Id. at 1069.
112. Id. at 1068 (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id. at 1070.
114. Id. at 1070-71.
115. Winchester v. McCue, 882 A.2d 143, 148-49 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
116. The wife had alleged that the husband’s financial assets had increased by
430%. Id. at 149. In addition, she argued that the trial court should have considered
the husband’s pension, which he valued at $200,000, as asset of his estate. Id. at 149 n.4.
The court concluded, however, that even including the husband’s pension in his estate
“would not have increased [the estate] to the dramatic degree contemplated in the third
prong of McHugh.” Id.
117. Id. at 149.
118. Id.
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ment would work an injustice is the same in both cases.119
Accordingly, the Bedrick court may have missed an opportunity to
create a consistent body of law in the arena of pre- and postnuptial
agreements. Nevertheless, a subsequent determination on the allo
cation of the burden may resolve this tension.
2. Guidance from Other Jurisdictions Evaluating
Agreements at Enforcement
In Massachusetts, a disproportionate distribution of assets
alone will not invalidate a postnuptial agreement, even under the
agreement-hostile fair and reasonable standard. In Ansin v. Cra
ven-Ansin, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently held
that postnuptial agreements were valid and enforceable, and con
cluded that among the requirements for enforcement was the re
quirement that the terms at the time of dissolution must be fair and
reasonable to be enforceable.120 The postnuptial agreement in Ansin provided that the wife disclaimed any interest in the husband’s
separately held real estate and would receive, inter alia, $5 million
from the husband in the event of divorce.121 The court rejected the
wife’s argument that she was receiving “a disproportionately small
percentage of the couple’s marital assets” and affirmed the lower
court’s decision that the agreement was fair and reasonable.122 In
so doing, the court noted that “[t]he wife points to no material
change between the time she, on the advice of counsel, executed
the marital agreement and the husband’s petition for divorce in
2006.”123
Decisions evaluating conscionability and fairness in the context
of prenuptial agreements are particularly instructive. In Blue v.
Blue, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in reviewing the terms of a
prenuptial agreement at the time of enforcement “to ensure that
119. Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 29 (Conn. 2011) (reviewing “question of
unconscionability”); Crews, 989 A.2d at 1064 n.2 (reviewing question of whether en
forcement of prenuptial agreement would work an injustice). In both Crews and
Bedrick, the courts made clear that the question of “[w]hether enforcement of an agree
ment would work an injustice is analogous to determining whether enforcement of an
agreement would be unconscionable.” Id. at 1066; see also Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 29
(“Thus, the trial court’s finding that enforcement of the postnuptial agreement would
work an injustice was tantamount to a finding that the agreement was unconscionable
at the time the defendant sought to enforce it.”).
120. Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E.2d 955, 961, 963-64 (Mass. 2010).
121. Id. at 960-61.
122. Id. at 969.
123. Id.
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facts and circumstances have not changed since the agreement was
executed to such an extent as to render its enforcement unconscion
able,” upheld the agreement as not unconscionable.124 The court
noted that “the parties’ financial situations were already disparate
when they entered into the agreement” and that the challenger
needed to do more than establish that the proponent had improved
his position financially: “She must also show that her position has
suffered in a manner which was beyond the contemplation of the
parties when they signed the agreement. In the alternative, [the
challenger] must establish that the agreement is oppressive or mani
festly unfair to her at the time of dissolution.”125
In Gant v. Gant, the West Virginia Supreme Court noted that
courts reviewing the terms of an agreement at the time of enforce
ment are primarily examining the foreseeability of the parties’ cir
cumstances at that time.126 The court also noted the likelihood that
the parties were not on equal financial footing at the outset:
[W]e are loath to apply a vague and entirely subjective standard
of “fairness.” Throughout all of contract law there is the recur
ring problem of disparity of bargaining power; thus if mere dispa
rate bargaining power alone is grounds for invalidating contracts,
contracts between rich and poor or between strong and weak will
always be of questionable validity. Such, however, is not the rule
elsewhere in contract law, and we see no policy reasons to make
it so in the law of prenuptial agreements.
The term “fair,” without some further elaboration, gives no
guidance whatsoever concerning which agreements will be bind
ing and which agreements will be struck down. Furthermore,
candor compels us to raise to a conscious level the fact that, as in
this case, prenuptial agreements will almost always be entered
into between people with property or an income potential to pro
tect on one side and people who are impecunious on the other.
Measuring an agreement by an undefined judicial standard of
fairness is an invitation to the very wealth redistribution that
these agreements are designed to prevent.127

These cases stand for the proposition that parties to prenuptial
and postnuptial agreements, while maybe in confidential relation
ships to each other, should be afforded the freedom to contract,
124. Blue v. Blue, 60 S.W.3d 585, 589, 591 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).
125. Id. at 590-91.
126. Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 114-15 (W. Va. 1985), overruled on other
grounds by Ware v. Ware, 687 S.E.2d 382, 390-91 (W. Va. 2009).
127. Id. at 114.
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regardless of the financial detriment to one of the bargaining par
ties. Moreover, any disparity in bargaining power that exists may
not only be similar to that seen in standard business contracts, and
thus should be subject to similar treatment, but also will be miti
gated by the advice of independent counsel. Accordingly, judicial
review of the terms of a postnuptial agreement at the time of en
forcement should be skeptical of claims of unconscionability, espe
cially when all procedural standards have been met.
Indeed, this approach is embodied by the standard in Crews v.
Crews, and thus should be adopted for postnuptial agreements.
The court in Bedrick, though it struck down the postnuptial agree
ment because enforcement would have caused an injustice, stopped
short of announcing a true standard of unconscionability at the time
of dissolution. Without creating tension with Bedrick, then, future
cases can adopt and apply the Crews standard.
C. Whose Burden is it Anyway?
With respect to prenuptial agreements, Connecticut’s position
is clear for both common law and statutory review: the challenger
bears the burden of establishing the agreement’s invalidity.128
However, the Bedrick court did not indicate who would bear that
burden of establishing a postnuptial agreement’s validity or
invalidity.
Many jurisdictions place the burden on the proponent of the
postnuptial agreement. In Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, the Massachu
setts Supreme Judicial Court definitively held that, “[w]here one
spouse challenges the enforceability of the agreement, the spouse
seeking to enforce the agreement shall bear the burden of satisfying
these criteria.”129 Arizona has done the same.130 In California, the
courts have more narrowly placed that burden on the party who
gained the advantage from the postnuptial agreement, but only af
ter the court determines that the agreement was unfair.131 The ALI
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution does not provide for a
fairness review of a postnuptial agreement’s terms at the time of
execution, but it does provide for a review of the procedural re
128. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36g(a) (2011); Crews v. Crews, 989 A.2d 1060, 1069
(Conn. 2010).
129. Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E.2d 955, 964 (Mass. 2010).
130. In re Estate of Harber, 449 P.2d 7, 16 (Ariz. 1969).
131. See In re Marriage of Burkle, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 181, 197, 201-02 (Ct. App.
2006); McCourt v. McCourt, No. BD514309, 2010 WL 5092780, slip op. at 44-45 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2010).
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quirements at that time, placing the burden on the proponent of the
agreement.132
Other jurisdictions place the burden on the challenger. By
statute in Colorado, “the party against whom enforcement is
sought” must prove the invalidity of the postnuptial agreement.133
Indeed, pre- and postnuptial agreements in Colorado are treated
identically.134 Texas and Wisconsin take the same legislative ap
proach.135 Additionally, in contrast to its position relative to proce
dural requirements, the ALI Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution places the burden on the challenger to establish that
enforcement of the agreement would work a substantial injustice.136
Connecticut may consider a hybrid, burden-shifting approach,
similar to the ALI’s approach, which would be consistent with its
requirement of heightened scrutiny of postnuptial agreements.
Pursuant to that heightened scrutiny and Bedrick’s application of
the fair and reasonable standard at the time of execution, the pro
ponent of the postnuptial agreement could be required to establish
that, at the time of execution, the terms were fair and reasonable,
full disclosure was made, and the parties entered into the agree
ment knowingly and voluntarily, “without any undue influence,
fraud, coercion, duress or similar defect.”137 If the proponent suc
cessfully established that the terms of the agreement were fair and
reasonable, then the burden would shift to the challenger to show
that enforcement of the agreement would cause an injustice. Here
the application of the Crews test for unconscionability would be the
logical solution and would help create a consistent body of law.
CONCLUSION
Knowing the contours of Bedrick v. Bedrick is only half the
battle. Clearly, those attorneys drafting postnuptial agreements
need to take extra care to ensure that the requirements identified in
Bedrick are properly addressed. Drafters should assume, however,
that their clients will one day be required to prove the validity of
132.

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOM
§ 7.04 (2002).
133. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-307 (West 2005).
134. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-302.
135. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.105 (West 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.88(6)
(West 2009); Nesmith v. Berger, 64 S.W.3d 110, 114-15 (Tex. App. Ct. 2001).
136. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOM
MENDATIONS § 7.05 (2002).
137. Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 27 (Conn. 2011).
MENDATIONS
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the agreement, rather than merely defend against it. Accordingly,
in addition to drafting a substantively fair agreement and executing
the agreement without any procedural defects that could be fatal if
later challenged, that agreement should incorporate provisions that
reflect the couple’s contemplation of potential future events. To
guard against claims of inadequate consideration, each spouse
should waive some interest to which he or she would be entitled in
the event of divorce or death, such as alimony or estate distribu
tions. Finally, the agreement should be revisited periodically and
reaffirmed, minimizing challenges to the terms of the agreement at
the time of dissolution. These steps, with careful and competent
drafting, will help guard any postnuptial agreement against later
challenges.
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APPENDIX138
Bruce Bedrick, in his brief to the Connecticut Supreme Court,
submitted the various postnuptial agreements and addendums
signed by him and his wife. Those agreements are reproduced in
this Appendix just as they appeared in the Defendant-Appellant’s
brief, with the exception of the bracketed text.
[Initial Agreement]139
THIS AGREEMENT made by and between DEBORAH E.
BEDRICK, a resident of the Town of Stafford Springs, County
of Tolland and State of Connecticut (hereinafter called
“Deborah”) and BRUCE BEDRICK, a resident of the Town of
Stafford Springs, County of Tolland and State of Connecticut,
(hereinafter called “Bruce”);
WITNESSETH:
The parties hereto are married to each other. Each is pos
sessed of property of value. This Agreement is executed by the
parties for the purpose of fixing and defining their several prop
erty rights as between themselves.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual
promises and undertakings hereinafter set forth, the parties agree
as follows:
1. Each party shall, during his or her lifetime, keep and re
tain sole ownership, control and enjoyment of all property, real
or personal, now owned or hereafter acquired by him or her, free
and clear of any claim by the other.
2. Bruce, for himself, his heirs, executors, administrators and
assigns, forever releases, waives and relinquishes all rights, claims
or interest which he otherwise might have upon the death of
Deborah subsequent to her marriage to him in or to her estate
under any statute of succession or any other law now or hereafter
adopted, expressly including but not limited to giving Bruce any
rights of homestead, dower, curtesy, right of election to take
against the Will, or other interest or rights in or to the estate or
any part or asset of the estate of Deborah, or any right to receive
any family allowance or any other allowance for maintenance or
support from said estate, and Bruce forever waives all right to act
as administrator or an administrator with Will annexed of the es
tate of Deborah.
138. Brief of the Defendant-Appellant at A1-A9, Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17
(Conn. 2010) (No. SC 18568).
139. The text below, and the eleven numbered paragraphs that follow, were
typewritten.
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3. Deborah, for herself, her heirs, executors, administrators
and assigns, forever releases, waives and relinquishes all rights,
claims or interest which she otherwise might have upon the death
of Bruce subsequent to her marriage to him in or to his estate
under any statute of succession or any other law now or hereafter
adopted, expressly including but not limited to giving Deborah
any rights of homestead, dower, curtesy, right of election to take
against the Will, or other interest or right in or to the estate or
any part of asset of the estate of Bruce or any right to receive any
family allowance for maintenance or support from said estate,
and Deborah forever waives all rights to act as administrator or
an administrator with Will annexed to the estate of Bruce, or to
any allowance for support or alimony in the event of a divorce or
dissolution of marriage.
4. This agreement shall become effective immediately upon
execution by the parties hereto.
5. Each party shall, upon the other’s request, take any and
all steps to execute, acknowledge and deliver to the other party
any and all further instruments necessary or expedient to effectu
ate the purpose and intent of this agreement.
6. Deborah and Bruce hereby acknowledge to the other that
each has fully acquainted the other with their respective means
and resources; and that each has informed the other that each
respectfully has income; that each of them has ascertained and
weighed all the facts, conditions and circumstances likely to influ
ence their judgment herein; that all matters embodied herein as
well as all questions pertaining thereto have been fully and satis
factorily explained to them; that they understand and consent to
all of the provisions hereof; and that they are entering into this
agreement freely and voluntarily and with full knowledge.
7. This agreement shall in no way restrict either or both of
the parties from holding property as joint tenants, with or with
out rights of survivorship or as tenants by the entireties, and shall
in no way restrict either from providing for the other by way of
gift or bequest.
8. Each party was advised by their respective attorneys as to
their legal rights and this agreement is being executed in accor
dance therewith.
9. This agreement contains the entire understanding of the
parties. There are no representations, warranties, promises, cov
enants or undertakings, oral or otherwise, other than those ex
pressly set forth herein.
10. This agreement shall inure to the benefit of and shall be
binding upon the heirs, executors and administrators of the
parties.

81

82

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:57

11. If any one or more of the agreements herein contained
are held by the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdic
tion to be unlawful, void or unenforceable for any reason whatso
ever, every other agreement contained in this agreement shall
nevertheless remain valid, subsisting and effective.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have here
unto set their hands and seals this 10th day of December, 1977.
[Signed Deborah Bedrick; Bruce Bedrick]
The following is a settlement agreement between Deborah
and Bruce Bedrick.140
1. In the event of dissolution of the marriage, Deborah will
be allowed to stay in the primary home, if there is one, for a
period of not more than six months. During that time, she will
pay half the rent or mortgage, and all the utilities.
2. In the event of dissolution of the marriage, Deborah will
remain an employee of Mr. Auto Wash for a period of not more
than six months.
3. In the event of dissolution of the marriage, Deborah will
be entitled to a cash settlement. The amount of this settlement
will be reviewed from time to time.
4. In the event that dissolution of the marriage is caused by
infidelity on the part of Deborah, there will be no cash settle
ment. Infidelity by Bruce will result in a doubling of the cash
settlement.
5. The marriage may be dissolved at any time for any reason
at no fault to either party, providing there is no infidelity.
6. This document will be reviewed from time to time, and
pertinent additions to it may be made at these times.
[Signed Deborah Bedrick; Bruce Bedrick]
[Untitled Paragraph]141
In the case of separation or divorce, it is our desire to be
independent of each other. As a result, neither Deb nor Bruce
will be responsible to pay any alimony or other monies outside
the settlement and child support agreed upon in this document.
[Signed Deborah Bedrick; Bruce Bedrick]
***
140. This text, and the following six numbered paragraphs, was handwritten. This
text appeared directly below the typed portion reproduced above.
141. This paragraph was handwritten and undated.

2012]

POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS IN CONNECTICUT

[First Addendum]142
ADDENDUM TO AGREEMENT OF 12/10/77
Dissolution of marriage will result in a cash settlement to
Deborah of $20,000. It will also relieve her of any joint liabilities,
specifically the mortgage on 23 Bay Road, East Hampton, CT.
She also waives any rights to any financial asset from this house.
[Dated: 5/1/80; signed: Deborah Bedrick, Bruce Bedrick]
***
[Second Addendum]
ADDENDUM TO AGREEMENT OF 12/10/77
Cash settlement as noted in 1980 will increase to $40,000.
Deborah is also, upon receiving settlement, relieved of any liabil
ity for mortgages on house and waives any claim to these assets.
[Dated: 5/15/83; signed: Deborah Bedrick, Bruce Bedrick]
***
[Third Addendum]
ADDENDUM TO AGREEMENT OF 12/10/77
Money in individual IRA accounts shall remain, and not be
affected by dissolution of the marriage.
[Dated: 5/10/84; signed: Deborah Bedrick, Bruce Bedrick]
***
[Fourth Addendum]
ADDENDUM TO AGREEMENT OF 12/10/77
1. Cash settlement increased to $55,000. All other prior con
ditions remain.
2. The companies Mr. Auto Wash and related companies be
long solely to Bruce. Deborah waives any claim to any assets of
any of these companies.
[Dated: 5/20/86; signed: Deborah Bedrick, Bruce Bedrick]
***
[Fifth Addendum]
ADDENDUM TO AGREEMENT OF 12/10/77
1. Cash settlement is increased to $75,000. Half the amount
is payable when Deborah leaves the primary home. The second
half is payable within 12 months of the first payment.
2. In addition to prior conditions, Deborah is relieved of any
liability for loans made by Bruce Bedrick or Bruce Bedrick En
142.

This addendum was handwritten, as were all that follow.
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terprises for business purposes, specifically the mortgage at 650
New Park Ave., West Hartford, CT. She also waives any claim to
the assets of this property.
[Dated: 5/18/89; signed: Deborah Bedrick, Bruce Bedrick]
***
[Untitled text]143
It is my desire that if I die before Bruce, while married, that
all my assets go to him, and that our children remain with him.
Secondly, it is my desire that if we should die simultane
ously, that Bonnie Bauer will accept custody of our children until
they are 21 years of age. I desire that my assets are put into a
trust for the children’s care and education. I would prefer that
Bonnie execute this trust, under the supervision of M. Jackson
Webber to ensure that the trust is used solely for this purpose.
My assets at the time of my death will be formulated using
the separation agreement formula.

143.

This text may have been Deborah Bedrick’s attempt at a will.

